Permission to reproduce the entire text may be obtained from the editor on request, via email to: Sikkuy@inter.net.il. Kindly refrain from reproducing this text without prior written permission.

Our thanks to the New Israel Fund for funding this year’s publication of the report.

A note to our readers

The past year has been perhaps the most critical in the history of relations between Arab citizens of Israel and the state.

· The year 1999 ended with a strike by heads of Arab local authorities. The outcome was an agreement, signed with the newly installed Barak government, designating the sum of NIS 100 million to be transferred to the local authorities during the year 2000. This agreement was not honored by the government.

· At the end of 2000, Arab citizens held demonstrations in the context of what would later become known as the Al Aqsa Intifada. During those demonstrations, 13 Arab citizens were shot to death by Israeli police and, in addition, one Jewish citizen died.

· A sustained public outcry and persistent effort led to creation of a state commission of inquiry to examine those events and the events leading up to them.

· In early 2001, Arab citizens largely abstained from participation in the new elections for prime minister.

During the last decade, awareness has grown in Israel that there is institutional discrimination against Arab citizens of this country. No one can now question this fact and no further proof is required to establish its veracity. Yet unfortunately, during the past year, no serious momentum for change has become evident in the relations between the state and Arab citizens. The situation as portrayed by the data from last year’s report (June 2000) is largely unchanged. We therefore decided not to commit resources to repeating the same detailed survey of the action taken by government ministries concerning the various issues on our agenda, but rather to angle the spotlight somewhat differently and examine the subject from a slightly different perspective.

One of the most effective ways for the state to counteract the pervasive discrimination suffered by Arab citizens would be to implement a long-range plan to close existing gaps. Programs of this type have been mapped out in recent years under the Rabin government (1992-1996) and under the Netanyahu government (1996-1999).

We decided this year to take a general look at the three principal existing programs for improving the lot of Arab citizens. We hope that this short survey will help prompt a reexamination of key attitudes and ways of doing things on the part of those who make the decisions that shape policy and its implementation. We further hope that this overview will prompt public figures and leaders in every sector, educators, and the polity as a whole to see that this issue receives the attention it deserves on the national agenda.

Dr. As’as Ghnem and Shalom (Shuli) Dichter.

Illustration: Typical infrastructure connecting a citizen’s house in a rural Jewish community with the various national systems

Tables:

1: Planned population growth (in numbers) for Jewish localities

2: Planned population growth (in numbers) for Arab localities

3: Comparison of implementation/planning for municipal streets

4: Increase in civil service employment, generally & for Arabs

5: Breakdown of all Arabs in the civil service by employment status

6: Arab civil service employees by government ministry

7: Arab women civil service employees, by government ministry

8: Arab women in the civil service, by employment status

9: Arab & Jewish women directors of government companies

10: Government-owned companies with Arab directors

11: Arab academics / professionals looking for work

Diagrams:

1: Public housing units built 1975-2000

2: Housing units planned for the next few years (%)

3: Sewage infrastructure requirements vs. plan

4: Jewish & Arab civil service employees (%)

5: Arab directors in government-owned companies

Appendices (to Chapter 2): Amendment No. 11 (Appointments) to the Civil Service Law & Amendment No. 11 to the Government Companies Law (excerpts)

Introduction

October 2000 was a wake-up call for large segments of the public and for some of the people in government as well. Many have said that the handwriting was on the wall, and a reading of prior Sikkuy reports and those of other organizations confirms it. And yet, has there really been any fundamental change? Have people in positions of leadership changed the way they view things?

In public discourse and academia, one increasingly hears calls for substantive change and a thoroughly new approach to relations between Arab citizens and the state. Yet the farther we get from the bloody events of last fall, the more it seems that alongside this sign of progress, there is entrenchment of contradictory views that automatically identify Arab citizens as part of the “enemy camp.” This traditional approach still has the greatest influence on the Israeli establishment, and one of the more widespread behaviors arising from it is a kind of broad disregard, leading in practice to the non-inclusion of Arab citizens in governmental development programs of all kinds.

Thus, for example, on the website of the Center for Local Authorities, there is a list of all the cities and towns in Israel. One of the subcategories gives current and planned population figures. The planned population is not listed for all localities, but for most of them it does appear. For example:

Table 1
Anticipated population growth (in numbers)
for Jewish localities

City / municipality	Current population (no. of persons)	Planned population (no. of persons)
Carmiel	41,000	120,000
Misgav region	14,500	55,000
Kfar Saba	80,000	100,000
Kiryat Malachi	22,000	45,000
Kiryat Yam	46,000	65,000
Rosh Ha’ayin	35,000	80,000
Hod Hasharon	35,000	80,000
Sderot	23,000	35,000

In contrast, there is no projected population figure given for any of the Arab localities listed. The appropriate space bears the indication: ----- .

Table 2

Planned population growth (in numbers)
for Arab localities

City / municipality	Current population (no. of persons)	Projected population (no. of persons)
Sahknin	21,000	-----
Nazareth	60,000	-----
Umm el Fahm	34,000	-----
Baka el Gharbiyeh	18,000	-----
Taibe	29,000	-----
Tira	18,000	-----
Shfaram	30,000	-----
Rahat	28,000	-----

This portrays very clearly the situation of Arab citizens in Israel, which remains unchanged in the wake of the events of October 2000. In general, a Jewish city in Israel has a good grip on its anticipated future and the planned increase in its population. The city avails itself of state infrastructures accordingly, and utilizes state budgets allocated for its growth as required. In the most natural fashion, the Ministry of Infrastructures, from its standpoint, views one of its roles as “developing water and land resources in accordance with government policies for population dispersal,” as set forth at the ministry’s website.

In Israel, population growth and dispersal are not an outcome solely of a natural dynamic, but are subject to governmental intervention and even redirection. Hence it’s no coincidence that the cities find it only natural that the government is a partner in planning their future development. The downside is that Arab communities are left out of the picture in terms of access to infrastructure development, and the lack of planning bears eloquent witness to the fact. Are we dealing here with consciously planned government policy, or happenstance? According to Ministry of Infrastructure policy as publicized, the government does have a population dispersal policy, hence the locations for infrastructure development cannot be considered coincidental.

Over the last decade, the government has developed some degree of awareness of the need to include Arab citizens in governmental development plans, and three such programs have been launched: one, to increase the number of Arab citizens in the civil service; the second, a multi-year plan for local development in the Arab sector; and third, a five-year plan to improve education for Arabic-speakers.

The program to increase the number of civil service jobs going to Arabs was launched six years ago, and a great deal of effort has been invested at the Civil Service Commission on implementation. And yet, the percentage of civil service jobs held by Arabs grew from 5.2% at the beginning of 1999 to only 5.7% at the beginning of 2001. This rate is a far cry from the objective set by Minister of Science, Culture and Sport Matan Vilnai at the Sikkuy conference in Nazareth in February 2000: from 5% to 10% within four years.

Unlike the other two programs, the one for improving education was “privatized” by contract with outside intervention agents. Given that education as a whole is a complex subject, and that the fashioning of changes in the educational sphere is not something that can be accomplished in one fell swoop, turning the job over to private organizations for implementation within a set time frame is liable to result in a one-time, passing episode, without creating the required infrastructure for long-term change. In and of itself, this privatized approach can dilute the government’s perceived responsibility for implementation, and certainly does not insure the government’s assumption of responsibility for the continuation of the process after the end of the program. Since education in future will still be the responsibility of the state, despite the fact that this particular program is being outsourced, we have included it in this review of government activities.

In the following pages, we will inspect these three programs with a critical eye, and at the end of each review we will offer alternative recommendations. We hope that this will contribute to focusing attention on the changes needed in this country in terms of its attitude toward Arab citizens.

· Attorney Ali Haider is director of the affirmative action and integration program at Sikkuy. His overview is based on thorough fieldwork and intensive involvement in promoting Arab representation in the civil service.

· Journalist Wadi’a Awauda’s survey of the implementation of the five-year plan for education is the first such study undertaken by Sikkuy, and more will be required in future to monitor the issue over time.

· The examination of the program for development of Arab communities is also the outcome of long-term monitoring of the initiative from its inception. We will continue monitoring the situation through the end of the current program and beyond.

The Editor

The Government’s Plan for Development in the Arab Localities

by Shalom (Shuli) Dichter

The development plan for Arab communities was prepared during the tenure of the Barak government and was given a budget of NIS 4 billion (a little less than $1 billion). At the time, when the plan was formulated and presented, there was a sense of good will and momentum. For this was an unprecedented step: The involvement of nearly all government ministries in implementing special programs to develop Arab communities is a new phenomenon. Was a revolution really taking place? Or was all this merely a dose of aspirin for a headache? To answer this question, we shall suggest a conceptual basis for addressing it, examine the plan from several angles, and conclude with recommendations for an alternative plan.

Infrastructures – the core of the problem

About half the planned funding is intended for building physical infrastructures, hence we will devote most of the space here to that aspect. In response to analyses that show that Arab citizens do not enjoy adequate infrastructure services in Israel, government officials typically claim that most of the investment is in national infrastructures: Arab citizens, too, travel on state roads; high-tension power lines bring electricity to the homes of Arab citizens as well; sewage from Arab communities flows, unimpeded by discrimination, into regional sewage systems; the national water system also serves Arabs; and so forth. In a paradoxical way, this contention merely serves to highlight an impossible situation. Since 1948, although very sophisticated infrastructure has developed on the national level, this development has “detoured around” Arab citizens in a way not to their advantage.

Four examples:

1. Roads between the Dan area (greater Tel Aviv and environs) and the Triangle, Wadi Ara and the Galilee (heavily Arab areas north of Tel Aviv) serve Arabs only for traveling to and from work in the Dan area at rush hour, around 5:00 A.M. and 7:00 P.M. This pattern arises due to a lack of employment centers in the areas where they reside. Further, the well-paved road typically ends at the junction where they turn off to enter their own town. From that point onward, they drive over potholes, through puddles of sewage, and over dangerous slopes in the road that do not appear in the municipal plan. Sometimes these roads are entirely unpaved.

2. Electricity supplied as far as the entrance to an Arab town does not serve the residents in the same way that it does in nearby Jewish towns. To gauge the difference, one need simply drive past these towns at night to see the size and intensity of the halo of light around each community. The Jewish town enjoys good street lighting which also serves to sketch in the general outlines of the town plan (and sometimes even of a new neighborhood that will be built in another year or two). In the Arab towns, the light filtering out of residential windows outlines the haphazard and unsystematic location of homes on privately-owned land. If there is any street lighting, it is found only in the town center, and the wires dance overhead instead of being buried underground as is the case in most nearby Jewish towns.

3. When a sewage system connects a large Arab town to the same infrastructure used by the surrounding Jewish towns, the fact merits an item in the newspapers and the “coexistence” value of the event is marked, even celebrated. Despite the substantial investment, however, connection of the town to the national system is only part of the job. About half the Arab households in Israel are not connected to their town’s internal sewage lines, but rather use household septic tanks. In contrast, thanks to adequate planning and infrastructure, nearly all Jewish households near these Arab communities are served by town sewage systems even before the owners of newly built homes move in.

4. The national water system also does not actually reach as far as the faucets in the typical Arab household. Anyone driving by can see the large black plastic water tanks on the roofs of homes in Arab villages. This generally signifies that the piped water supply in that town is not reliable. The black tank supplies home water usage needs when there’s no water in the village’s pipelines. In nearly every Arab town these tanks are visible on the rooftops. In nearby Jewish towns, they don’t exist.

The infrastructures in Israel are well developed, but Arab localities are often like isolated islands within the national and regional systems. In general, the various systems extend only as far as the entrance to Arab towns, and then continue on to neighboring Jewish towns where individual households are hooked up, in contrast to the Arab households which are not. Despite knowing that the local authorities in Arab towns are not an effective enough link between the national infrastructure and the individual household, it’s clear that the state has hitherto not assisted the Arab local councils in building internal infrastructures for the localities as has been the case with Jewish towns. Only adequate internal municipal infrastructure will enable Arab residents to be served by the national infrastructure systems.

More than half of the development plan for Arab localities is meant to address this problem, and link Arab citizens with the infrastructures serving the country as a whole – physical as well as educational, employment, etc. infrastructure systems.

Development for Arab communities: three approaches

There are at least three principal approaches to the question of development for Arab localities:

1. The incremental approach. Proponents contend that every single additional shekel allocated for improving the living conditions of Arab citizens is a worthwhile achievement. The approach acknowledges that the entire apparatus of state bureaucracy and state agencies and their activities are directed in advance to the wellbeing of Jewish citizens only, and there’s no real chance of fundamental change in that situation. Hence one must make the most of any slightest indication of receptivity on the part of decision-makers in government to further any program possible, while working to change the minds of others. At the same time, steps involving budget should be modest in scope so as not to provoke opposition in the various government offices and, bit by bit, proceed to effect change. This approach has no over-arching vision that differs in the essentials from the reality as it is now. And this approach would appear to be the one informing the government’s “Plan for the Development of Communities in the Arab Sector.”

2. The second approach proposes comprehensive structural change. Given that discrimination is an outcome of the basic Zionist character and purpose of Israel as a state for Jews, there’s no chance of achieving equality under these circumstances. Thus, only far-reaching changes in the definition of the State itself could have as its natural consequence equality between Jewish and Arab citizens. This would be a parliamentary-political change, and the primary avenues for promoting it are via the Knesset, the public, and internationally.

3. The third approach holds that far-reaching change in the state’s attitude toward Arab citizens is required, so as to alter the government’s approach to parity in the allocation of resources. This approach does not condition such change on a sweeping alteration in the definition of the state. The most crucial change required, it says, is in the relations between the state and Arab citizens, but it will necessarily be comprehensive and will influence the state’s relations with all its citizens. Hence, the arena for this effort is the Knesset, in the forums where key decisions are made, and mainly among the people in government, from ministers to the civil servants who implement policy. This approach also demands civic action in support of the change on the part of the public. We will try, based on this approach, to sketch the outlines of the alternative conception recommended at the conclusion of this report.

The Plan: its formulation and its principal tenets

The plan was prepared during the year 2000 by the Coordination and Control Division of the Prime Minister’s Office. A small staff met with various experts and with the heads of Arab local authorities. A quick survey was done with a limited sample, followed by another quick survey of all Arab local authorities. In general, the staff was under pressure to get the plan moving, with speed the paramount consideration, in an attempt to get results in the short term. Even its premature publication – in June of 2000 in Yedioth Aharonoth, in response to Sikkuy’s annual report detailing discrimination against Arab citizens in every sphere of life – was evidently subject to this pressure. Most of the energy was devoted to maintaining connections with people throughout government, at the Ministry of Finance and various other ministries, to assure cooperation vis-a-vis the presentation of the proposed 2001 budget due in June of 2000. In that month, the draft was submitted to the heads of Arab local authorities and since then has been the subject of intense public debate.

The undue haste with which the report was prepared would seem to have prevented the staff from carrying out two crucial processes: (1) a thorough, comprehensive examination of the needs in the field and a study of the target population from different perspectives, and not solely through the lens of “Arabist” expertise; and (2) a systematic, broad inclusion of the Arab public in the preparation of the plan from the start and on through the point it becomes interactively implemented. Not to have done so contradicts one of the principles mentioned in the plan itself, stating that “cooperation between the [Arab] sector, its localities and its leadership, and the governmental aegis for the process, is a necessary condition and a mutual test.”

Skipping these two important steps, and the desire for exclusive sponsorship of the process, leaves its sponsors facing a hopeless situation: (1) the plan is built on archaic and fundamentally erroneous assumptions; (2) cooperation from the Arab public is forthcoming, in the best case, only by dint of political pressure, meaning that the plan is being forced on them.

Tenets of the plan published in June 2000 relied on a superficial, stereotyped perception of Arab society, as if they’d been taken from books by Arabists of the 1940s (like Moshe Stavsky and others). Based on the first draft, distributed for comment to Arab public figures and heads of various organizations, it emerges that the basic assumptions on which the plan rests are taken from a conceptual world that doesn’t reflect reality. According to the description in the booklet, Arab society keeps women closeted away from the outside world; the family-based social structure is completely pervasive (with “omnivorous clan warfare”); the motivation of men who build their sons a home on the family plot of land is merely their own self-aggrandizement; and similar colorful descriptions. Most ironically, the conclusion to one chapter of the plan states: “The plan puts at center stage population groups that have hitherto been pushed to the sidelines: [Arab] women and children.” The implication is that development plans involving a wealth of resources have, until very recently, been focused on the wellbeing of Arab men! Alas, it isn’t so.

This general attitude is what evidently led the authors of the plan to suggest that in order for Arab citizens to reach equality with Jewish citizens, a fundamental change must be effected in Arab society itself in Israel. The second draft that came out in October 2000 was missing some of the more extreme statements, but the original conception remained basically unchanged. Although the plan included proposed processes for improving infrastructures to be undertaken by government (see below – on the feasibility of implementation), responsibility for the situation is attributed to the structure of traditional Arab society, and the main objective is modifying the way of life in the direction of modern Western society by various means. In the chapter that gives an overview of the situation, there is not even one mention of the role of the state and its responsibility for creating and perpetuating this situation, and responsibility is passed along almost exclusively to Arab citizens themselves.

This is cause for grave concern, since the entire process is supposed to signify assumption of responsibility by the state for the gap created over the years, and hence responsibility for closing it. The tendency to offload responsibility for the situation onto the citizens, their traditions and the structure of their society raises doubts about the nature of the proposed solutions, and certainly about the likely pace and willingness of the government, on its side, to implement them. It’s hard to imagine that this approach would be employed vis-a-vis all groups of citizens. Would, for example, any decision-maker ever take it into his head to suggest making the budget for public housing or education for the ultra-Orthodox sector conditional on having haredi women remove their head coverings, or on discontinuing the practice of arranged marriages?

Indeed, given its historic significance, a plan of this kind demands forethought, recognition, awareness, planning, and attention much more profound and meaningful than what this plan seems to have enjoyed. One might risk adding that if the plan had been put forward some years ago, and if this and similar programs had been granted the kind of attention and staff time and energy by the establishment that is now being put into the commission of inquiry about the events of October 2000 – maybe, just maybe, no demonstrators would have been killed and there would be no need for such a commission of inquiry.

The feasibility of implementation –
how much money is needed, and to what end?

More than half the plan for the development of Arab communities is devoted to infrastructures. The present review cannot comment on all sections of the plan, but to convey the essence we will set forth five of them. This will allow a rough estimate of the extent to which the plan is likely to meet existing needs. Each section is compared with a counterpart from some other, similar program to convey some sense of the implications of the planned budget.

· According to the overall budget for the program, NIS 4 billion (just under $1 billion) will be allocated for the development of 74 Arab localities with a total population of 610,000 persons over a period of four years. Of this sum, NIS 2 billion will be budgeted via a special allocation from the Finance Ministry to the various other ministries and another NIS 2 billion will be earmarked for redirection internally by the ministries. This sum includes budget amounts that in any case are intended for the Arab population. Calculated per capita, the funding for the program for Arab localities averages about NIS 1,600 (under $400) per person per year.

In comparison: The Ofek program for focused (point by point) aid to needy communities, prepared at the same time as the one to assist Arab localities, budgets NIS 1.14 billion over three years, or NIS 342 million a year. This aid is for 11 localities (one of them a Bedouin town) with a total population of about 340,000, i.e., about NIS 1,000 per resident per year.

The physical and organizational infrastructures in all of the Ofek localities were built and installed a long time ago, and the investment now is in improving and enhancing them. The average sum to be invested per resident in the program for Arab localities is only a little bit larger than the sum to be spent for the benefit of the residents under the Ofek program. This small gap bears witness to a lack of awareness of the situation in the Arab localities, where basic infrastructures have yet to be built or installed, as opposed to funds purely for maintenance or enhancement.

· The program budgets NIS 45 million a year for internal street construction for all the 74 Arab towns together. Meanwhile, none of these Arab towns or localities has a planned, improved street infrastructure extending as far as the homes of its residents.

What are designated Arab “cities” under this plan, despite the relative absence of urban infrastructures (Nazareth, Umm el Fahm, Taibe, Shfaram, Tamra, Sakhnin, Baka al Gharbiyeh and Tira) have a total combined population of about 242,000 persons. The figure for the program as a whole is 610,000 persons.

In comparison: In Hadera alone (with 80,000 residents, about a third of the aggregate population of the Arab cities combined), the city in 1998 invested NIS 66 million in street development and associated underground infrastructure. This was for maintenance and improvements to existing infrastructures, not for entirely new ones. Ofek, the program for aid to specific localities, budgets about NIS 21 million a year for municipal streets for 11 localities, and nearly all of them already have an existing infrastructure of internal streets.

Table 3
Comparison of implementation/planning for municipal streets
(by number of residents, duration of implementation/planning, status of existing infrastructure, amount in NIS and amount per capita)

	no. of residents	duration of implementation / planning	status of existing infrastructure	amount budgeted (NIS)	Amount per capita (NIS)
Jewish town (Hadera)	80,000 persons	one year (1998)	based on plans & in place	66 million	825
74 Arab cities and towns in the development program	610,000 persons	per year, for each of 4 years	improvised	46 million	75
11 cities and towns in the Ofek program	340,000 persons	per year, for each of 3 years	based on plans & in place	21 million	62

· The government plan includes building 5,000 housing units with public funds in Arab localities over 4 years (1,250 units per year).

In comparison: Between 1975 and the year 2000, 337,000 public housing units were built in Israel, fewer than 1,000 of them in Arab communities. In September 2000, the director-general of the Ministry of Housing stated that there are currently 211,000 public housing units in various stages of planning. Based on the National Master Plan #35, toward the year 2020 there will be a need for another 700,000 housing units in Israel.

1,250 units a year is about half of one percent of the units now in the planning pipeline. And 5,000 units are 2.3% of the number now planned. The needs of the Arab citizens of Israel are much greater than their relative share of the population, due to tremendous neglect in past years.

· Based on the calculations generally used at the Ministry of the Interior, the cost of a sewage system infrastructure, including pipelines (NIS 40,000 per housing unit) for the average locality in the plan (8,200 residents) is NIS 66 million. The target population of the plan is calculated at 120,000 households (the total number of Arab citizens is calculated at 220,000 households). Over half the households in Arab localities are not connected to a sewage system, and must use household septic tanks. The plan allocates loans of NIS 200 million, part of that as grants. This will suffice, in the best case, for 3 localities out of the 74 covered by the plan.

In comparison: In the Ofek program, the government budgets NIS 200 million, plus an additional NIS 100 million from the Jewish National Fund (KKL), including grants, over 3 years to deal with sewage system needs for 11 communities, nearly all of which already have a sewage infrastructure with connections to residential units.

· Based on Ministry of Health figures, another 56 family health clinics are needed in Arab communities. Hence NIS 10 million (half from the Ministry of Health, and half from the Ministry of Finance) has been budgeted in the plan over 4 years, meaning NIS 2.5 million a year. The average cost of building a family health clinic is NIS 0.5 million. Thus the budgeted amount will suffice for 5 clinics a year, for a total of 20 over the four years covered.

At that pace, meeting the need outlined in the plan itself will require 12 years.

In comparison: Between 1993 and 1996, 48 family health clinics have been built in Arab communities, at a rate 2.5 times faster than that proposed by this plan.

This figure gives us an idea of the pace at which a realistic program – based on recognition of the true state of affairs, and assuming the government shoulders its responsibility – could close the existing gaps.

Conclusion and recommendations

A broad gap exists between the plan and the needs it purports to address, needs that are an outcome of half a century of institutional discrimination. The plan’s budget for one year is less than 0.5% of the national budget. This confirms what was noted at the beginning of this review: We are not dealing here with a real change or an historic process, and certainly not with a meaningful redress of discrimination. Perhaps what we do have here is an expression of good will, but it may be simply a tactical-political move intended to make some citizens feel better, and the government along with them – but that’s not enough.

In August 2000, Sikkuy prepared an alternative plan. It cannot be presented here in its entirety, but the five principal points on which it is based are as follows:

► The plan must have a vision: eliminating (not just narrowing) the gaps between Jewish and Arab citizens; full parity among all citizens in the allocation of state funds.

► A timetable will be set for making this change happen pursuant to that vision: an effort over ten years, at least.

► The principal change will be in the government’s attitude toward Arab citizens, and hence in the way the effort is conducted.

► A joint entity will be created representing the government and the Arab public; this body will promote and monitor progress in the implementation of existing programs and will prepare additional ones.

► The program will be based on continuous, in-depth needs assessment and reassessment to be conducted throughout, while the program is in process.

The inception of an effort based on these principles should prepare the ground for a new relationship between Arab citizens and the state, and between Arab citizens and Jewish citizens. Undoubtedly, the change that ensues in the government’s approach will influence budgets intended for Jews, since the national budget is not going to grow on the way to equality. The impact of parity on the allocation of resources will have an effect on the Jewish public, and at certain stages and from certain standpoints, Arab citizens may benefit disproportionately compared with Jewish citizens. Thus, energy and effort must be invested in winning the hearts and minds of the Jewish public, for whom this temporary and occasionally unequal impact will be a novel experience.

Arab Citizens in the Civil Service

by Attorney Ali Haider

On 18 December 2000, the Knesset passed Amendment No. 11 to the Civil Service Law (Appointments) of 5719-1959, which holds, among other things, that in all the various professional ranks at all levels of the nation’s civil service, at every ministry and in every affiliated independent agency or organization, suitable representation, consonant with the relevant circumstances, will be given to Arabs, including Druse and Circassians (see Appendix A to this section of the report). The amendment was the outcome of an initiative by MK Dr. Azmi Bishara, who submitted proposed legislation to insure suitable representation for the Arab population in the civil service, followed by MK Salah Tarif’s submission of supplementary legislation assuring suitable representation for the Druse community. The Barak government adopted both legislative proposals, and suggested additional changes to assure suitable representation of both genders and of persons with disabilities.

The Rabin government (1992-1996) led in acknowledging the need to take affirmative action to increase the number of Arabs in the civil service. Since then, Arabs have been actively recruited for civil service employment. Since the inception in October 1993 of an officially organized effort to integrate Arabs and Druse into the civil service, 1,759 Arabs have joined the ranks of public employment.

In June 1999, the Barak government named a Ministerial Committee for Arab Affairs. This committee set itself the task of furthering the progress of the civil service employment campaign and other development programs. Between the committee’s establishment halfway through 1999 and the end of the year 2000, an additional 428 Arabs joined the civil service. Assuming this increment to be due to efforts of the Barak government’s ministerial committee, the results fall short of the objective set by the committee’s chairman, Minister Matan Vilnai, early in the year 2000: The goal was to raise Arab representation in the civil service from 5% to 10% within four years.

The Civil Service Commissioner’s report shows that as of 14 April 2001, nearly two years after the special committee was named, there were 3,128 Arab civil servants, representing about 5.7% of the 54,337 total complement of civil service employees.

Included in these figures are employees of government ministries themselves; not included are employees of government-owned companies, teachers in the educational system, employees of the state employment service, National Insurance Institute employees, and employees of the various other government authorities and agencies.

Table 4

Increase in civil service employment generally,
and of Arab civil service employees (in absolute numbers and percentages)

Year	Total no. Arab civil servants	Total no. of civil servants	% of civil servants who are Arabs
1992	1,117	53,549	2.1
1993	1,369	53,914	2.5
1994	1,679	55,278	3
1995