

Sikkuy's Report
on Equality & Integration
of the Arab Citizens
in Israel 2000-2001

Editor: Shalom (Shuli) Dichter

Spring, 2001

Sikkuy
The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality

E-Mail address: Sikkuy@inter.net.il
Tel: +972-2-6541225 Fax: +972-2-6541108
17, Hameshoreret Rachel St., Beit Hakerem, Jerusalem 96348

Diagrams: Dr. Avi Ofer
Illustrations: Pablo Alon

Arabic translation: Hassan Translations, POB 221, Nazareth, lilag@netvision.net.il
English translation: Deborah Reich, debmail@netvision.net.il

Special thanks to:

Dr. Khaled Abu Usbeh
Mussawa Center

The staffs of the Central Bureau of Statistics and
the State Comptroller's Office for help with data collection

This report is also published in Arabic and English editions
and appears on our website:

www.sikkuy.org.il

© We permit and encourage citation and reproduction of excerpts from this text, by photocopying or other means, subject to clear attribution as to their source. Permission to reproduce the entire text may be obtained from the editor on request, via email to: Sikkuy@inter.net.il. Kindly refrain from reproducing this text without prior written permission.

Our thanks to the New Israel Fund for funding this year's publication of the report.

Contents

Introduction

The Government's Plan for Development
in the Arab Localities / Shalom (Shuli) Dichter

Arab Citizens in the Civil Service / Attorney Ali Haider

Five-Year Plan for Improving Arab Education:
How It's Holding Up in Reality / Wadi'a Awauda

Looking Ahead

About Sikkuy

A note to our readers

The past year has been perhaps the most critical in the history of relations between Arab citizens of Israel and the state.

- The year 1999 ended with a strike by heads of Arab local authorities. The outcome was an agreement, signed with the newly installed Barak government, designating the sum of NIS 100 million to be transferred to the local authorities during the year 2000. This agreement was not honored by the government.
- At the end of 2000, Arab citizens held demonstrations in the context of what would later become known as the Al Aqsa Intifada. During those demonstrations, 13 Arab citizens were shot to death by Israeli police and, in addition, one Jewish citizen died.
- A sustained public outcry and persistent effort led to creation of a state commission of inquiry to examine those events and the events leading up to them.
- In early 2001, Arab citizens largely abstained from participation in the new elections for prime minister.

During the last decade, awareness has grown in Israel that there is institutional discrimination against Arab citizens of this country. No one can now question this fact and no further proof is required to establish its veracity. Yet unfortunately, during the past year, no serious momentum for change has become evident in the relations between the state and Arab citizens. The situation as portrayed by the data from last year's report (June 2000) is largely unchanged. We therefore decided not to commit resources to repeating the same detailed survey of the action taken by government ministries concerning the various issues on our agenda, but rather to angle the spotlight somewhat differently and examine the subject from a slightly different perspective.

One of the most effective ways for the state to counteract the pervasive discrimination suffered by Arab citizens would be to implement a long-range plan to close existing gaps. Programs of this type have been mapped out in recent years under the Rabin government (1992-1996) and under the Netanyahu government (1996-1999).

We decided this year to take a general look at the three principal existing programs for improving the lot of Arab citizens. We hope that this short survey will help prompt a reexamination of key attitudes and ways of doing things on the part of those who make the decisions that shape policy and its implementation. We further hope that this overview will prompt public figures and leaders in every sector, educators, and the polity as a whole to see that this issue receives the attention it deserves on the national agenda.

Dr. As'as Ghnem and Shalom (Shuli) Dichter.

Illustration: Typical infrastructure connecting a citizen's house in a rural Jewish community with the various national systems

Tables:

- 1: Planned population growth (in numbers) for Jewish localities
- 2: Planned population growth (in numbers) for Arab localities
- 3: Comparison of implementation/planning for municipal streets
- 4: Increase in civil service employment, generally & for Arabs
- 5: Breakdown of all Arabs in the civil service by employment status
- 6: Arab civil service employees by government ministry
- 7: Arab women civil service employees, by government ministry
- 8: Arab women in the civil service, by employment status
- 9: Arab & Jewish women directors of government companies
- 10: Government-owned companies with Arab directors
- 11: Arab academics / professionals looking for work

Diagrams:

- 1: Public housing units built 1975-2000
- 2: Housing units planned for the next few years (%)
- 3: Sewage infrastructure requirements vs. plan
- 4: Jewish & Arab civil service employees (%)
- 5: Arab directors in government-owned companies

Appendices (to Chapter 2): Amendment No. 11 (Appointments) to the Civil Service Law & Amendment No. 11 to the Government Companies Law (excerpts)

Introduction

October 2000 was a wake-up call for large segments of the public and for some of the people in government as well. Many have said that the handwriting was on the wall, and a reading of prior Sikkuy reports and those of other organizations confirms it. And yet, has there really been any fundamental change? Have people in positions of leadership changed the way they view things?

In public discourse and academia, one increasingly hears calls for substantive change and a thoroughly new approach to relations between Arab citizens and the state. Yet the farther we get from the bloody events of last fall, the more it seems that alongside this sign of progress, there is entrenchment of contradictory views that automatically identify Arab citizens as part of the “enemy camp.” This traditional approach still has the greatest influence on the Israeli establishment, and one of the more widespread behaviors arising from it is a kind of broad disregard, leading in practice to the non-inclusion of Arab citizens in governmental development programs of all kinds.

Thus, for example, on the website of the Center for Local Authorities, there is a list of all the cities and towns in Israel. One of the subcategories gives current and planned population figures. The planned population is not listed for all localities, but for most of them it does appear. For example:

Table 1
Anticipated population growth (in numbers)
for Jewish localities

City / municipality	Current population (no. of persons)	Planned population (no. of persons)
Carmiel	41,000	120,000
Misgav region	14,500	55,000
Kfar Saba	80,000	100,000
Kiryat Malachi	22,000	45,000
Kiryat Yam	46,000	65,000
Rosh Ha'ayin	35,000	80,000
Hod Hasharon	35,000	80,000
Sderot	23,000	35,000

In contrast, there is no projected population figure given for any of the Arab localities listed. The appropriate space bears the indication: ----- .

Table 2
Planned population growth (in numbers)
for Arab localities

City / municipality	Current population	Projected population
----------------------------	---------------------------	-----------------------------

	(no. of persons)	(no. of persons)
Sahknin	21,000	-----
Nazareth	60,000	-----
Umm el Fahm	34,000	-----
Baka el Gharbiyeh	18,000	-----
Taibe	29,000	-----
Tira	18,000	-----
Shfaram	30,000	-----
Rahat	28,000	-----

This portrays very clearly the situation of Arab citizens in Israel, which remains unchanged in the wake of the events of October 2000. In general, a Jewish city in Israel has a good grip on its anticipated future and the planned increase in its population. The city avails itself of state infrastructures accordingly, and utilizes state budgets allocated for its growth as required. In the most natural fashion, the Ministry of Infrastructures, from its standpoint, views one of its roles as “developing water and land resources in accordance with government policies for population dispersal,” as set forth at the ministry’s website.

In Israel, population growth and dispersal are not an outcome solely of a natural dynamic, but are subject to governmental intervention and even redirection. Hence it’s no coincidence that the cities find it only natural that the government is a partner in planning their future development. The downside is that Arab communities are left out of the picture in terms of access to infrastructure development, and the lack of planning bears eloquent witness to the fact. Are we dealing here with consciously planned government policy, or happenstance? According to Ministry of Infrastructure policy as publicized, the government does have a population dispersal policy, hence the locations for infrastructure development cannot be considered coincidental.

Over the last decade, the government has developed some degree of awareness of the need to include Arab citizens in governmental development plans, and three such programs have been launched: one, to increase the number of Arab citizens in the civil service; the second, a multi-year plan for local development in the Arab sector; and third, a five-year plan to improve education for Arabic-speakers.

The program to increase the number of civil service jobs going to Arabs was launched six years ago, and a great deal of effort has been invested at the Civil Service Commission on implementation. And yet, the percentage of civil service jobs held by Arabs grew from 5.2% at the beginning of 1999 to only 5.7% at the beginning of 2001. This rate is a far cry from the objective set by Minister of Science, Culture and Sport Matan Vilnai at the Sikkuy conference in Nazareth in February 2000: from 5% to 10% within four years.

Unlike the other two programs, the one for improving education was “privatized” by contract with outside intervention agents. Given that education as a whole is a complex subject, and that the fashioning of changes in the educational sphere is not something that can be accomplished in one fell swoop, turning the job over to private organizations for implementation within a set time frame is liable to result in a one-time, passing episode, without creating the required infrastructure for long-term change. In and of itself, this privatized approach can dilute the government’s perceived responsibility for implementation, and certainly does not insure the

government's assumption of responsibility for the continuation of the process after the end of the program. Since education in future will still be the responsibility of the state, despite the fact that this particular program is being outsourced, we have included it in this review of government activities.

In the following pages, we will inspect these three programs with a critical eye, and at the end of each review we will offer alternative recommendations. We hope that this will contribute to focusing attention on the changes needed in this country in terms of its attitude toward Arab citizens.

- Attorney Ali Haider is director of the affirmative action and integration program at Sikkuy. His overview is based on thorough fieldwork and intensive involvement in promoting Arab representation in the civil service.
- Journalist Wadi'a Awauda's survey of the implementation of the five-year plan for education is the first such study undertaken by Sikkuy, and more will be required in future to monitor the issue over time.
- The examination of the program for development of Arab communities is also the outcome of long-term monitoring of the initiative from its inception. We will continue monitoring the situation through the end of the current program and beyond.

The Editor

The Government's Plan for Development in the Arab Localities

by Shalom (Shuli) Dichter

The development plan for Arab communities was prepared during the tenure of the Barak government and was given a budget of NIS 4 billion (a little less than \$1 billion). At the time, when the plan was formulated and presented, there was a sense of good will and momentum. For this was an unprecedented step: The involvement of nearly all government ministries in implementing special programs to develop Arab communities is a new phenomenon. Was a revolution really taking place? Or was all this merely a dose of aspirin for a headache? To answer this question, we shall suggest a conceptual basis for addressing it, examine the plan from several angles, and conclude with recommendations for an alternative plan.

Infrastructures – the core of the problem

About half the planned funding is intended for building physical infrastructures, hence we will devote most of the space here to that aspect. In response to analyses that show that Arab citizens do not enjoy adequate infrastructure services in Israel, government officials typically claim that most of the investment is in national infrastructures: Arab citizens, too, travel on state roads; high-tension power lines bring electricity to the homes of Arab citizens as well; sewage from Arab communities flows, unimpeded by discrimination, into regional sewage systems; the national water system also serves Arabs; and so forth. In a paradoxical way, this contention merely serves to highlight an impossible situation. Since 1948, although very sophisticated infrastructure has developed on the national level, this development has “detoured around” Arab citizens in a way not to their advantage.

Four examples:

1. **Roads** between the Dan area (greater Tel Aviv and environs) and the Triangle, Wadi Ara and the Galilee (heavily Arab areas north of Tel Aviv) serve Arabs only for traveling to and from work in the Dan area at rush hour, around 5:00 A.M. and 7:00 P.M. This pattern arises due to a lack of employment centers in the areas where they reside. Further, the well-paved road typically ends at the junction where they turn off to enter their own town. From that point onward, they drive over potholes, through puddles of sewage, and over dangerous slopes in the road that do not appear in the municipal plan. Sometimes these roads are entirely unpaved.
2. **Electricity** supplied as far as the entrance to an Arab town does not serve the residents in the same way that it does in nearby Jewish towns. To gauge the difference, one need simply drive past these towns at night to see the size and intensity of the halo of light around each community. The Jewish town enjoys good street lighting which also serves to sketch in the general outlines of the town plan (and sometimes even of a new neighborhood that will be built in another year or two). In the Arab towns, the light filtering out of residential windows outlines the haphazard and unsystematic location of homes on privately-owned land. If there is any street lighting, it is found only in the town center, and the wires dance overhead instead of being buried underground as is the case in most nearby Jewish towns.
3. When a **sewage system** connects a large Arab town to the same infrastructure used by the surrounding Jewish towns, the fact merits an item in the newspapers and the

“coexistence” value of the event is marked, even celebrated. Despite the substantial investment, however, connection of the town to the national system is only part of the job. About half the Arab households in Israel are not connected to their town’s internal sewage lines, but rather use household septic tanks. In contrast, thanks to adequate planning and infrastructure, nearly all Jewish households near these Arab communities are served by town sewage systems even before the owners of newly built homes move in.

4. The national **water system** also does not actually reach as far as the faucets in the typical Arab household. Anyone driving by can see the large black plastic water tanks on the roofs of homes in Arab villages. This generally signifies that the piped water supply in that town is not reliable. The black tank supplies home water usage needs when there’s no water in the village’s pipelines. In nearly every Arab town these tanks are visible on the rooftops. In nearby Jewish towns, they don’t exist.

The infrastructures in Israel are well developed, but Arab localities are often like isolated islands within the national and regional systems. In general, the various systems extend only as far as the entrance to Arab towns, and then continue on to neighboring Jewish towns where individual households are hooked up, in contrast to the Arab households which are not. Despite knowing that the local authorities in Arab towns are not an effective enough link between the national infrastructure and the individual household, it’s clear that the state has hitherto not assisted the Arab local councils in building internal infrastructures for the localities as has been the case with Jewish towns. Only adequate internal municipal infrastructure will enable Arab residents to be served by the national infrastructure systems.

More than half of the development plan for Arab localities is meant to address this problem, and link Arab citizens with the infrastructures serving the country as a whole – physical as well as educational, employment, etc. infrastructure systems.

Development for Arab communities: three approaches

There are at least three principal approaches to the question of development for Arab localities:

1. **The incremental approach.** Proponents contend that every single additional shekel allocated for **improving the living conditions** of Arab citizens is a worthwhile achievement. The approach acknowledges that the entire apparatus of state bureaucracy and state agencies and their activities are directed in advance to the wellbeing of Jewish citizens only, and there’s no real chance of fundamental change in that situation. Hence one must make the most of any slightest indication of receptivity on the part of decision-makers in government to further any program possible, while working to change the minds of others. At the same time, steps involving budget should be modest in scope so as not to provoke opposition in the various government offices and, bit by bit, proceed to effect change. This approach has no over-arching vision that differs in the essentials from the reality as it is now. And this approach would appear to be the one informing the government’s “Plan for the Development of Communities in the Arab Sector.”
2. The second approach proposes **comprehensive structural change**. Given that discrimination is an outcome of the basic Zionist character and purpose of Israel as a state for Jews, there’s no chance of achieving equality under these circumstances. Thus, only far-reaching changes in the definition of the State itself could have as its natural consequence equality between Jewish and Arab citizens. This would be a parliamentary-

political change, and the primary avenues for promoting it are via the Knesset, the public, and internationally.

3. The third approach holds that **far-reaching change in the state's attitude** toward Arab citizens is required, so as to alter the government's approach to parity in the allocation of resources. This approach does not condition such change on a sweeping alteration in the definition of the state. The most crucial change required, it says, is in the relations between the state and Arab citizens, but it will necessarily be comprehensive and will influence the state's relations with all its citizens. Hence, the arena for this effort is the Knesset, in the forums where key decisions are made, and mainly among the people in government, from ministers to the civil servants who implement policy. This approach also demands civic action in support of the change on the part of the public. We will try, based on this approach, to sketch the outlines of the alternative conception recommended at the conclusion of this report.

The Plan: its formulation and its principal tenets

The plan was prepared during the year 2000 by the Coordination and Control Division of the Prime Minister's Office. A small staff met with various experts and with the heads of Arab local authorities. A quick survey was done with a limited sample, followed by another quick survey of all Arab local authorities. In general, the staff was under pressure to get the plan moving, with speed the paramount consideration, in an attempt to get results in the short term. Even its premature publication – in June of 2000 in *Yedioth Aharonoth*, in response to Sikkuy's annual report detailing discrimination against Arab citizens in every sphere of life – was evidently subject to this pressure. Most of the energy was devoted to maintaining connections with people throughout government, at the Ministry of Finance and various other ministries, to assure cooperation vis-a-vis the presentation of the proposed 2001 budget due in June of 2000. In that month, the draft was submitted to the heads of Arab local authorities and since then has been the subject of intense public debate.

The undue haste with which the report was prepared would seem to have prevented the staff from carrying out two crucial processes: (1) a thorough, comprehensive examination of the needs in the field and a study of the target population from different perspectives, and not solely through the lens of "Arabist" expertise; and (2) a systematic, broad inclusion of the Arab public in the preparation of the plan from the start and on through the point it becomes interactively implemented. Not to have done so contradicts one of the principles mentioned in the plan itself, stating that "cooperation between the [Arab] sector, its localities and its leadership, and the governmental aegis for the process, is a necessary condition and a mutual test."

Skipping these two important steps, and the desire for exclusive sponsorship of the process, leaves its sponsors facing a hopeless situation: (1) the plan is built on archaic and fundamentally erroneous assumptions; (2) cooperation from the Arab public is forthcoming, in the best case, only by dint of political pressure, meaning that the plan is being forced on them.

Tenets of the plan published in June 2000 relied on a superficial, stereotyped perception of Arab society, as if they'd been taken from books by Arabists of the 1940s (like Moshe Stavsky and others). Based on the first draft, distributed for comment to Arab public figures and heads of various organizations, it emerges that the basic assumptions on which the plan rests are taken from a conceptual world that doesn't reflect reality. According to the description in the booklet, Arab society keeps women closeted away from the outside world; the family-based

social structure is completely pervasive (with “omnivorous clan warfare”); the motivation of men who build their sons a home on the family plot of land is merely their own self-aggrandizement; and similar colorful descriptions. Most ironically, the conclusion to one chapter of the plan states: “The plan puts at center stage population groups that have hitherto been pushed to the sidelines: [Arab] women and children.” The implication is that development plans involving a wealth of resources have, until very recently, been focused on the wellbeing of Arab men! Alas, it isn’t so.

This general attitude is what evidently led the authors of the plan to suggest that in order for Arab citizens to reach equality with Jewish citizens, a fundamental change must be effected in Arab society itself in Israel. The second draft that came out in October 2000 was missing some of the more extreme statements, but the original conception remained basically unchanged. Although the plan included proposed processes for improving infrastructures to be undertaken by government (see below – on the feasibility of implementation), responsibility for the situation is attributed to the structure of traditional Arab society, and the main objective is modifying the way of life in the direction of modern Western society by various means. In the chapter that gives an overview of the situation, there is not even one mention of the role of the state and its responsibility for creating and perpetuating this situation, and responsibility is passed along almost exclusively to Arab citizens themselves.

This is cause for grave concern, since the entire process is supposed to signify assumption of responsibility by the state for the gap created over the years, and hence responsibility for closing it. The tendency to offload responsibility for the situation onto the citizens, their traditions and the structure of their society raises doubts about the nature of the proposed solutions, and certainly about the likely pace and willingness of the government, on its side, to implement them. It’s hard to imagine that this approach would be employed vis-a-vis all groups of citizens. Would, for example, any decision-maker ever take it into his head to suggest making the budget for public housing or education for the ultra-Orthodox sector conditional on having *haredi* women remove their head coverings, or on discontinuing the practice of arranged marriages?

Indeed, given its historic significance, a plan of this kind demands forethought, recognition, awareness, planning, and attention much more profound and meaningful than what this plan seems to have enjoyed. One might risk adding that if the plan had been put forward some years ago, and if this and similar programs had been granted the kind of attention and staff time and energy by the establishment that is now being put into the commission of inquiry about the events of October 2000 – maybe, just maybe, no demonstrators would have been killed and there would be no need for such a commission of inquiry.

The feasibility of implementation – how much money is needed, and to what end?

More than half the plan for the development of Arab communities is devoted to infrastructures. The present review cannot comment on all sections of the plan, but to convey the essence we will set forth five of them. This will allow a rough estimate of the extent to which the plan is likely to meet existing needs. Each section is compared with a counterpart from some other, similar program to convey some sense of the implications of the planned budget.

- According to the overall budget for the program, NIS 4 billion (just under \$1 billion) will be allocated for the development of 74 Arab localities with a total population of 610,000 persons over a period of four years. Of this sum, NIS 2 billion will be budgeted via a special allocation from the Finance Ministry to the various other ministries and another NIS 2 billion will be earmarked for redirection internally by the ministries. This sum

includes budget amounts that in any case are intended for the Arab population. Calculated per capita, the funding for the program for Arab localities averages about NIS 1,600 (under \$400) per person per year.

In comparison: The Ofek program for focused (point by point) aid to needy communities, prepared at the same time as the one to assist Arab localities, budgets NIS 1.14 billion over three years, or NIS 342 million a year. This aid is for 11 localities (one of them a Bedouin town) with a total population of about 340,000, i.e., about NIS 1,000 per resident per year.

The physical and organizational infrastructures in all of the Ofek localities were built and installed a long time ago, and the investment now is in improving and enhancing them. The average sum to be invested per resident in the program for Arab localities is only a little bit larger than the sum to be spent for the benefit of the residents under the Ofek program. This small gap bears witness to a lack of awareness of the situation in the Arab localities, where basic infrastructures have yet to be built or installed, as opposed to funds purely for maintenance or enhancement.

- ◉ The program budgets NIS 45 million a year for internal street construction for all the 74 Arab towns together. Meanwhile, none of these Arab towns or localities has a planned, improved street infrastructure extending as far as the homes of its residents.

What are designated Arab “cities” under this plan, despite the relative absence of urban infrastructures (Nazareth, Umm el Fahm, Taibe, Shfaram, Tamra, Sakhnin, Baka al Gharbiyeh and Tira) have a total combined population of about 242,000 persons. The figure for the program as a whole is 610,000 persons.

In comparison: In Hadera alone (with 80,000 residents, about a third of the aggregate population of the Arab cities combined), the city in 1998 invested NIS 66 million in street development and associated underground infrastructure. This was for maintenance and improvements to existing infrastructures, not for entirely new ones. Ofek, the program for aid to specific localities, budgets about NIS 21 million a year for municipal streets for 11 localities, and nearly all of them already have an existing infrastructure of internal streets.

Table 3
Comparison of implementation/planning for municipal streets
(by number of residents, duration of implementation/planning, status of existing
infrastructure, amount in NIS and amount per capita)

	no. of residents	duration of implementation / planning	status of existing infrastructure	amount budgeted (NIS)	Amount per capita (NIS)
Jewish town (Hadera)	80,000 persons	one year (1998)	based on plans & in place	66 million	825
74 Arab cities and towns in the development program	610,000 persons	per year, for each of 4 years	improvised	46 million	75
11 cities and towns in the Ofek program	340,000 persons	per year, for each of 3 years	based on plans & in place	21 million	62

- The government plan includes building 5,000 housing units with public funds in Arab localities over 4 years (1,250 units per year).

In comparison: Between 1975 and the year 2000, 337,000 public housing units were built in Israel, fewer than 1,000 of them in Arab communities. In September 2000, the director-general of the Ministry of Housing stated that there are currently 211,000 public housing units in various stages of planning. Based on the National Master Plan #35, toward the year 2020 there will be a need for another 700,000 housing units in Israel.

1,250 units a year is about half of one percent of the units now in the planning pipeline. And 5,000 units are 2.3% of the number now planned. The needs of the Arab citizens of Israel are much greater than their relative share of the population, due to tremendous neglect in past years.

- Based on the calculations generally used at the Ministry of the Interior, the cost of a sewage system infrastructure, including pipelines (NIS 40,000 per housing unit) for the average locality in the plan (8,200 residents) is NIS 66 million. The target population of the plan is calculated at 120,000 households (the total number of Arab citizens is calculated at 220,000 households). Over half the households in Arab localities are not connected to a sewage system, and must use household septic tanks. The plan allocates loans of NIS 200 million, part of that as grants. This will suffice, in the best case, for 3 localities out of the 74 covered by the plan.

In comparison: In the Ofek program, the government budgets NIS 200 million, plus an additional NIS 100 million from the Jewish National Fund (KKL), including grants, over 3 years to deal with sewage system needs for 11 communities, nearly all of which already have a sewage infrastructure with connections to residential units.

- Based on Ministry of Health figures, another 56 family health clinics are needed in Arab communities. Hence NIS 10 million (half from the Ministry of Health, and half from the Ministry of Finance) has been budgeted in the plan over 4 years, meaning NIS 2.5 million a year. The average cost of building a family health clinic is NIS 0.5 million. Thus the budgeted amount will suffice for 5 clinics a year, for a total of 20 over the four years covered.

At that pace, meeting the need outlined in the plan itself will require 12 years.

In comparison: Between 1993 and 1996, 48 family health clinics have been built in Arab communities, at a rate 2.5 times faster than that proposed by this plan.

This figure gives us an idea of the pace at which a realistic program – based on recognition of the true state of affairs, and assuming the government shoulders its responsibility – could close the existing gaps.

Conclusion and recommendations

A broad gap exists between the plan and the needs it purports to address, needs that are an outcome of half a century of institutional discrimination. The plan's budget for one year is less than 0.5% of the national budget. This confirms what was noted at the beginning of this review: We are not dealing here with a real change or an historic process, and certainly not with a meaningful redress of discrimination. Perhaps what we do have here is an expression of good will, but it may be simply a tactical-political move intended to make some citizens feel better, and the government along with them – but that's not enough.

In August 2000, Sikkuy prepared an alternative plan. It cannot be presented here in its entirety, but the five principal points on which it is based are as follows:

- ▶ The plan must have a vision: eliminating (not just narrowing) the gaps between Jewish and Arab citizens; full parity among all citizens in the allocation of state funds.
- ▶ A timetable will be set for making this change happen pursuant to that vision: an effort over ten years, at least.
- ▶ The principal change will be in the government's attitude toward Arab citizens, and hence in the way the effort is conducted.
- ▶ A joint entity will be created representing the government and the Arab public; this body will promote and monitor progress in the implementation of existing programs and will prepare additional ones.
- ▶ The program will be based on continuous, in-depth needs assessment and reassessment to be conducted throughout, while the program is in process.

The inception of an effort based on these principles should prepare the ground for a new relationship between Arab citizens and the state, and between Arab citizens and Jewish citizens. Undoubtedly, the change that ensues in the government's approach will influence budgets intended for Jews, since the national budget is not going to grow on the way to equality. The impact of parity on the allocation of resources will have an effect on the Jewish

public, and at certain stages and from certain standpoints, Arab citizens may benefit disproportionately compared with Jewish citizens. Thus, energy and effort must be invested in winning the hearts and minds of the Jewish public, for whom this temporary and occasionally unequal impact will be a novel experience.

Arab Citizens in the Civil Service

by Attorney Ali Haider

On 18 December 2000, the Knesset passed Amendment No. 11 to the Civil Service Law (Appointments) of 5719-1959, which holds, among other things, that in all the various professional ranks at all levels of the nation's civil service, at every ministry and in every affiliated independent agency or organization, suitable representation, consonant with the relevant circumstances, will be given to Arabs, including Druse and Circassians (see Appendix A to this section of the report). The amendment was the outcome of an initiative by MK Dr. Azmi Bishara, who submitted proposed legislation to insure suitable representation for the Arab population in the civil service, followed by MK Salah Tarif's submission of supplementary legislation assuring suitable representation for the Druse community. The Barak government adopted both legislative proposals, and suggested additional changes to assure suitable representation of both genders and of persons with disabilities.

The Rabin government (1992-1996) led in acknowledging the need to take affirmative action to increase the number of Arabs in the civil service. Since then, Arabs have been actively recruited for civil service employment. Since the inception in October 1993 of an officially organized effort to integrate Arabs and Druse into the civil service, 1,759 Arabs have joined the ranks of public employment.

In June 1999, the Barak government named a Ministerial Committee for Arab Affairs. This committee set itself the task of furthering the progress of the civil service employment campaign and other development programs. Between the committee's establishment halfway through 1999 and the end of the year 2000, an additional 428 Arabs joined the civil service. Assuming this increment to be due to efforts of the Barak government's ministerial committee, the results fall short of the objective set by the committee's chairman, Minister Matan Vilnai, early in the year 2000: The goal was to raise Arab representation in the civil service from 5% to 10% within four years.

The Civil Service Commissioner's report shows that as of 14 April 2001, nearly two years after the special committee was named, there were 3,128 Arab civil servants, representing about 5.7% of the 54,337 total complement of civil service employees.

Included in these figures are employees of government ministries themselves; not included are employees of government-owned companies, teachers in the educational system, employees of the state employment service, National Insurance Institute employees, and employees of the various other government authorities and agencies.

Table 4
Increase in civil service employment generally,
and of Arab civil service employees (in absolute numbers and percentages)

Year	Total no. Arab civil servants	Total no. of civil servants	% of civil servants who are Arabs
1992	1,117	53,549	2.1
1993	1,369	53,914	2.5
1994	1,679	55,278	3
1995	1,997	56,183	3.5
1996	2,231	56,809	4
1997	2,340	57,286	4.1
1998	2,537	57,580	4.4
10/1999	2,818	58,115	4.8
4/2001	3,128	54,337	5.7

Table 5
Breakdown of all Arabs in the civil service by employment status
(in absolute numbers and percentages)

Employment status	Temporary	Contract	Permanent	Intern	Total
Number of Arab employees	21	1,106	1,092	99	2,318
% share of total Arab civil service employees	1%	35%	61%	3%	100%
Total no. of civil servants in each category	423	3,827	40,159	5,393	49,702 ¹
% share of all civil service employees	1	25	72%	2	100%

The big gap is most conspicuous with permanent employees and those working under contract. Tenure and the chance of receiving tenure are a significant factor in drawing people to civil service jobs to begin with. According to these data, an Arab's chances of receiving tenure are lower than those of a Jew, and his or her access to job security even lower.

Arab civil servants holding advanced degrees total 975, representing 31.2% of all Arab workers in the civil service (444 with a B.A., 146 with a master's degree, 385 with a doctoral degree). Among all civil servants (updated through 6 May 2001), 19,125 have advanced degrees (34%).

Arab civil servants with university or other post-secondary education total 1,903, or 60.8% of all Arabs in the civil service.

¹ Updated as of 6 May 2001.

The Civil Service Commissioner has begun implementing the previous government's decision to integrate Arabs, Druse and Circassians into the civil service via a multi-year program (2000-2003). Under this initiative, 300 Arab citizens – 75 a year – are to be hired for civil service jobs.

Table 6
Arab civil service employees by government ministry
(in absolute numbers and percentages)

MINISTRY	No. of Arabs employed there	% of all Arabs in civil service	as a % of that ministry's workforce	comments
Health	1,925	61.5%	7.12%	incl. hospitals
Religious Affairs	345	11.0%		not employees of Ministry itself
Finance	213	6.8%	3.26%	including autonomous affiliates
Labor & Welfare	190	6.1%	5.39%	including autonomous affiliates
Education & Culture	127	4.1%	4.77%	including autonomous affiliates
Other ministries	328	10.4%		
TOTAL	3,128	100%		Total Arabs in civil service

Some 2,800 Arab civil service employees, 89.5% of all Arab civil servants, are employed in only five government ministries. The Ministry of Health employs 1,925 Arabs (61.5% of all Arabs in the civil service); this includes employees of government hospitals. In the remaining ministries, the representation of Arab citizens is marginal or nonexistent. Not a single Arab works in the Ministry of National Infrastructures. In the Ministry of Communications and the Ministry of Internal Security, there is one Arab.

Most Arab civil servants are employed in adjunct positions or designated positions dealing with the Arab sector, mainly in areas heavily populated by Arabs in the north of Israel, or in positions which can only be filled by Arabs. The representation of Arab citizens in the major government ministries in Jerusalem is marginal or nonexistent.

Despite the efforts invested to promote greater participation by Arab citizens in civil service employment, their presence is far from reflecting their proportion of the population as a whole (18.6%).

Most of the Arabs who are employed in the civil service fill professional positions, generally involving the provision of health, welfare, education, or religious services. In any case, they are markedly absent from senior policy-making positions. Their absence is particularly conspicuous in the ministries whose work influences the future of the state – such as infrastructures, housing and construction, industry and trade, and tourism.

The data bear witness to the fact that Arab citizens are kept at arm's length from the senior levels of the civil service. They have no role at the forums where decisions are made and policy set, programs devised and initiatives launched, and ideas with implications for the entire population of the state debated and developed.

Arab women in the civil service

The civil service currently employs 1,150 Arab women, representing 36.8% of all Arab civil servants. Women in general in the civil service total 34,786 (62.3%), nearly double the proportion that Arab women comprise of all Arab civil service employees.

Of the Arab women in the civil service, 318 have a post-secondary education (169 have a B.A., 48 have a master's degree, and 101 have a doctorate). They represent 32.6% of the total number of Arab civil servants with a post-secondary education. Overall, 1,012 Arab women civil servants have a high school or post-secondary education, representing 95.8% of all Arab women civil service employees.

Table 7
Arab women civil service employees by government ministry
(in absolute numbers and percentages)

MINISTRY	No. of Arab women employed there	of all Arab women civil service employees
Health, incl. Hospitals	937	81.47%
Labor & Welfare, incl. autonomous affiliates	66	5.73%
Education, incl. autonomous affiliates	37	3.21%
Finance, inc. autonomous affiliates	33	2.86%
Justice	23	2.0%
Other ministries	54	4.69%
TOTAL	1,150	100%

Table 8
Breakdown of Arab women in the civil service by employment status
(in absolute numbers and percentages)

Employment status	Temporary	Contract	Permanent	Intern	Total
Number of Arab women employees	6	339	765	40	1150
Share of total Arab women civil service employees	0.5%	29.5%	66.5%	3.5%	100%
Share of all Arab civil service employees	0.2%	10.8%	24.5%	1.3%	100%

As with Arab men in the civil service, Arab women, too, are concentrated in only five ministries. Communications, transportation and its quasi-governmental affiliates, science and culture, foreign affairs, and internal security do not have a single Arab woman employee, and in the Ministry of Industry and Trade there is only one Arab woman employee.

Despite the relative growth in the number of Arab women civil servants in recent years, their presence remains quite small relative to the proportion of civil service jobs filled by women in general (62.3%). Evidently, access to civil service employment for Arabs is still mainly for men. And though Jewish women have begun filling more senior positions (general managers, attorneys, judges, etc.), Arab women are still serving in junior positions.

Arab directors in government-owned companies

On 30 May 2000, the Knesset passed an amendment to the Government Companies Law of 5735-1975, guaranteeing that boards of directors of government-owned companies would include fair representation for Arabs (see Appendix B to this section of the report). This amendment is the outcome of an initiative by MK Dr. Azmi Bishara and MK Salah Tarif.

A report by the Government Companies Authority dealing with government-owned companies, subsidiaries and mixed companies, current as of 2 April 2001, shows that Arabs have been named as directors on only 18 boards of the total of 111 boards of directors of government-owned companies, subsidiaries, and mixed companies.

Of 668 directors of government-owned companies, only 22 are Arab citizens of Israel: 3.29% of all such directors.

Table 9
Arab and Jewish women directors of government-owned companies
(in absolute numbers and in percentages)

	Arab women	Jewish women	total
Number of women	5	242	247
of all such directors	0.75%	36.23%	36.98%
of all such women directors	2.02%	97.97%	100%

Table 10
List of Government-Owned Companies with Arab Directors

Name of Company	No. of Arab Directors	Total No. of Directors	Maximum No. of Directors
l Nautical College	1	5	8
l Gov't. Coins & Medals Corp. Ltd.	2	9	13
l Assoc. of Community Centers Ltd.	(Chrmn.)	12	25
Foreshore Development Co. Ltd.	1	6	6
Acre Development Co. Ltd.	1	11	11
ronmental Services Co.	1	12	15
ne Education & Training Authority	1	4	5
l Electric Corp. Ltd.	2	12	21
mish – Government & Municipal Co.	1	5	7
0 mme Hotels International Ltd.	1	6	10
1 dar, Israel National Housing Ltd.	3	17	20
2 n Urban Development Co. Ltd.	1	10	13
3 Biochem.& Microbiol.Assoc.Study Fund	1	3	5
4 ernment Employees Study Fund	1	7	7
5 maceutical Study Funds Ltd.	1	4	5
6 rance Fund for Natural Risks in Agr.Ltd.	1	8	14
7 trical & Mechanical Services (EMS) Ltd.	1	8	12
8 ach” Nechsay Hail Ltd.	1	6	7
TOTAL	22	145	204

In the companies with Arab directors, their average representation is almost reasonable (15.2%). This progress is illusory, however, since companies with Arab directors represent only a fraction of the total roster of government-owned companies. The situation overall is thus a long way from where it ought to be. The picture that emerges is what the Americans call tokenism (known in Israel as “a fig leaf”). The establishment, in other words, can live quite well with this state of affairs, since one can always say truthfully that there are indeed Arab directors.

Potential Arab candidates worry that their participation may be viewed as cooperation with this tokenism. They do not wish to make things easier for those people in the establishment whose aim is to perpetuate the existing situation and whose strategy is to permit a minimum of essentially cosmetic changes, with further appointments trickling in at a snail's pace. Nonparticipation, on the other hand, does not resolve the dilemma. It's a vicious circle.

Fair representation on the boards of government-owned companies: the case of Arab women

In 1993, a new Amendment No. 6 to the Government Companies Law of 5735-1975 promised fair representation for both genders on the board of directors of government-owned companies. This amendment was intended to introduce a measure of equality in the representation of women in the management councils of government-owned companies and corporations. When the amendment was adopted, in 1993, 59 women were serving as directors of government-owned companies in Israel, as compared with 800 men. In 1994, about a year after the amendment went into effect, the Israel Women's Network observed that the authorities were ignoring the explicit instructions of the law and were not giving preference to women nominees. The IWN appealed to Israel's Supreme Court for assistance. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal and instructed government ministers to appoint women as directors of government-owned companies. In the wake of the Supreme Court ruling, as of today, the proportion of such positions filled by women has risen to 37%.

On behalf of women, the Israel Women's Network needed a Supreme Court ruling in order to force the government to carry out the law. One may hope that the government has learned its lesson and will move to implement the law fully, without obliging civic organizations to have to force the government's compliance via an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Employment of Arabs with advanced degrees

During January and February of 2001, 3,895 Arabs with advanced degrees registered at employment service offices for unemployed professional and academic job-seekers. They comprised 30% of all Israelis looking for work at that professional level. In all, there were 131,071 people seeking work in Israel at the time, 31,730 of them Arabs.

Arab citizens seeking employment constitute 24% of all job-seekers in Israel.
Arab academics looking for work constitute 30% of all academic and professional job-seekers in Israel.

These data reveal that if in a liberal democratic society, higher education is a means to social and economic mobility, the reality in Israel with respect to Arab professionals and academics is the obverse: the more education they have, the lower their chances of finding suitable work.

Moreover, the number of Arab professionals and academics registered with state employment service offices does not reflect the actual number who are unemployed, because a large proportion of these have already given up on finding work commensurate with their talents. Some look on their own, and others refrain from registering with the employment service because of the negative social stigma associated with doing so.

Table 11
Breakdown of Arab academics / professionals registered as looking for work
(in absolute numbers)

Academic / professional area	registered
Humanities / Liberal Arts	1,492
Scientific fields	974
Engineering	631
Social Sciences	663
Other professional / academic categories	64
No profession specified	71
Total	3,895

Conclusion

One may easily observe, from even a cursory review of the data presented here, that the presence of Arab citizens in the civil service and in government-owned companies remains negligible.

It is not sufficient to pass laws guaranteeing a fair representation to Arab citizens in the various public and governmental ministries, agencies, and offices, and it is not sufficient for the government to make decisions and propose programs. There is a tremendous need for the inclusion of Arab citizens at all stages, from conception and planning onward, in the programs that deal with their lives and their future. Further, there's a crucial need for faith, persuasion, and perseverance to effect change in the present reality and bring more Arab citizens into senior positions, not only because such steps would ameliorate their own employment problems, but also because concrete steps are required to actualize the principle of equality and the participation of Arab citizens in running the state.

The present government, which in its platform stated that it would act to create jobs for Arabs in government and public agencies at the most senior levels, needs to invest very serious efforts to actualize this goal and implement relevant new laws that have been passed.

Expanding the number of Arab citizens who work in government, public organizations, academia, and the private sector is the government's responsibility.

Government must also move to encourage new avenues for economic development and create unique new programs to close existing socioeconomic gaps, which in many respects are worse today than ever. Furthermore, the government must assure that Arabs are named to the committees that tender public bids, the nominating committees, and the committees that decide how the taxpayers' money will be spent, where, and for whose benefit.

Appendix A

Civil Service Law (Appointments) (Amendment No.11) 5761-2000

Appropriate
representa-
tion in civil
service
employment

- 15.A (a) Among civil service employees, at every level and in every professional capacity, in every ministry and independent affiliate organization, suitable representation, consonant with the circumstances, shall be given to both genders, to persons with disabilities, and to the Arab population, including Druse and Circassians (in this law: appropriate representation).
- (b) The government shall work to promote appropriate representation among civil service employees consonant with goals it shall set, and to that end, among other things:
- (1) The relevant ministry or affiliate, and the Civil Service Commissioner, each in its area, will take such steps as may be required consonant with the circumstances, to enable and encourage appropriate representation, including adjustments as defined in section 8(E) of the Equal Rights for Persons with Disabilities Law, 5758-1998;
 - (2) The government may designate positions to be filled, insofar as possibly, only by candidates who are competent to do the job, from among a group entitled to appropriate representation pursuant to the instructions of subsection (a) that is not appropriately represented, as the government shall decide;
 - (3) The government may direct, concerning a position or group of positions or a rank or group of ranks, to be detailed in the directive, and for a period fixed therein, that preference be given to candidates from a group entitled to appropriate representation pursuant to the instructions of subsection (a) which is not appropriately represented, when such persons have abilities resembling the abilities of other candidates; and with respect to giving preference to persons with disabilities, the government may determine that the instructions under this section shall pertain to persons with certain disabilities or at a certain level of severity.
- (c) The directives of this section shall pertain to any manner of hiring and promotion under this law, including appointments made by tender, employment not via tender, and acting appointments.
- (d) The Civil Service Commissioner, after consultation with the Authority for the Advancement of the Status of Women, the Commission on Equal Rights for Persons with Disabilities, and the organizations that in the Civil Service Commissioner's opinion deal with promoting the rights of the groups entitled to appropriate representation under subsection (a), shall submit to the government, once yearly, recommendations concerning objectives that the government should set under subsection (b).
- (e) The Civil Service Commissioner is authorized to determine directives for the implementation of this section, and concerning the granting of preference to candidates as stated in subsection (b) is authorized to determine instructions concerning the evaluation of the

abilities of candidates.

(f) Each ministry and independent affiliate shall submit to the Civil Service Commissioner, once a year, a report on its implementation of the instructions of this section in which it details, among other things, data with respect to the representation of both genders, of persons with disabilities, and of members of the Arab population, including Druse and Circassians, in said ministry or independent affiliate.

(g) The Civil Service Commissioner shall submit to the government and to the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee of the Knesset, once yearly, a report as to the activities carried out under this section during that year along with data as to appropriate representation in the civil service.

(h) In this section –

“Persons with Disabilities,” and “the Commission on Equal Rights for Persons with Disabilities” – are as defined in the Law on Equal Rights for Persons with Disabilities, 5755-1998;

“The Authority for the Promotion of the Status of Women” – are as defined in the Law of the Authority for the Promotion of the Status of Women, 5755-1998.

Appendix B

Government Companies Law (Amendment No. 11), 5760-2000

Appropriate
representa-
tion for the
Arab
population

- 18.A (a) All boards of directors of government companies shall have appropriate representation for the Arab population.
- (b) Until such appropriate representation is attained, ministers shall appoint, insofar as possible under the relevant circumstances, directors from among the Arab population.
- (c) For the purpose of this section, the Arab population – includes the Druse and Circassian population.

Five-Year Plan for Improving Arab Education: How It's Holding Up in Reality

by **Wadi'a Awauda**

The Ministry of Education began implementing a five-year plan during the current (2000-2001) school year, via external intervention organizations that bid successfully on a contract published in June of 2000. The Ministry of Education views this program as the driving force for achieving full equality between the Arab and the Jewish educational systems. The plan, which sidestepped the physical element, focuses on improving educational and pedagogical tools with the aim of significantly raising the scope of achievements of Arab students. However, a critical reading of the program itself and an examination of the proposed means for carrying it out is most instructive, and disturbing. A serious gap is evident between what was desired and what transpired, between the intention of the ministry and the outcome.

Staff who prepared the plan

The plan was formulated by a steering committee headed by Dr. Yitzhak Tomer. The committee named nine senior staffers from the ministry, among them three Arabs: Ali Assadi, in charge of Arab education; Abd Elhalim A-Zouabi, who was a political consultant to the Minister of Education; and a ministry supervisor, Salah Taha, who was added to the team after the plan had already been drawn up.

Senior staff people in the Arab educational system – supervisors and managers – did not participate in the plan's preparation. From the preparatory phase onward, there was no structured involvement on the part of other Arab public figures or groups like the Monitoring Committee for Arab Education. Dr. Khaled Abu Asbeh, a researcher at the Brookdale Institute and lecturer in the Department of Sociology at Bar Ilan University and at Beit Berl College, said: "Had we been involved in the planning, we would not have agreed that the plan should measure needs solely through the lens of the present moment, rather than looking to the future." It may well be that the way the plan was conceived now presents an obstacle to its acceptance by the Arab public and its assimilation by the schools.

Selling the plan to the designated public

In the plan as published, there is no budget earmarked for supporting its introduction and assimilation. In the north, it was simply presented to administrators in the field. On 18 January 2001, all the Arab principals and supervisors in the northern region were assembled at Ibillin to hear this presentation. A great many of the participants at the gathering voiced opposition to having the news suddenly descend upon them in that fashion, without having been consulted during the preparatory stages about the content or means of implementation, considering that they were the target population for its actualization. In many schools where the plan is now technically operating, the little that teachers and principals know about the five-year plan, its goals, and its methods is insufficient to enable them to put the plan into practice.

Teacher training

In the secondary schools, the plan's implementation relies on instruction by external staff employed by contractors. The Ministry of Education did not select these teachers and left the matter of their selection to the contractors, at the discretion of the principals. This arrangement carries an inherent risk that unsuitable teachers may be selected. The director of the five-year

plan from Sakhnin College emphasized the importance of providing work for numerous unemployed teachers, and added that “this is something crucial for Arab society.”

It may be that such a sequence of events does serve Arab society in the short run, but it does not serve the goals of the five-year plan. And, in any case, who will see to the employment of these teachers when the five years have passed? In the elementary schools, the plan aspires to train internal instructional personnel to handle its implementation, but in practice a large proportion of these instructors are external and are not even asked to submit to an interview or provide credentials to Ministry of Education supervisors. Thus there is some doubt as to how this may be helping prepare the existing workforce in the schools.

After the conferences at which the plan was presented to the various regions during January of 2001, the contractors involved were supposed to begin holding training workshops for teachers. As of mid-April, our investigation showed that among school principals, who are directly responsible for implementing the plan, at least some have not yet participated in a training workshop or received any guidance whatsoever. All that can have been done thus far is selection of the teachers to participate in the program along with the subjects slated for enrichment. Meramanet, for instance (one of the contractors), organized only three intensive workshops for teacher training. In a conversation with Mr. Mark Eldad of that company on 29 April 2001, he said: “Marmanet will offer another day-long workshop every week when implementation begins.”

Meager financial resources

In a Ministry of Education publication distributed in February of 2001, it was stated that the five-year plan had taken as its meta-goal: “Creating equality of opportunity between pupils in the Jewish school system and pupils in the Arab and Druse school systems.” NIS 250 million had been budgeted over five years beginning with the 1999-2000 (5760) school year. As estimated by the Monitoring Committee for Arab Education, the Arab educational system’s immediate needs total about NIS 840 million. In response to our query about the lean budget, the coordinator of the program at headquarters, supervisor Salah Taha said: “The Minister of Education at the time, Yossi Sarid, is the one who set the budget. It’s not enough, but something can be done with these funds.”

For the sake of comparison, we should note that the Ma’ayan Torah education system affiliated with the Shas movement received NIS 45 million for the 5760 school year, merely to wipe out its debts from prior years.

It would seem that the plan is far from achieving its principal goal – closing existing gaps. Instead of a thoroughgoing program to solve the essential problems of education in the Arab sector, it is more like a support and enrichment project intended for small groups of underachieving schoolchildren. The program makes do with small, focused outlays that achieve small improvements for short periods and skips over the main obstacles in the system that have been perpetuated for the last fifty years.

Selection of the participating agencies of intervention

Three operational entities won the contract for which bids were sought by the Ministry of Education in June of 2001, and they divided the Arab sector among themselves into regions as follows:

1. **The Center for Educational Technology (CET) and the Open University** – the lower northern region, Haifa region, and the northern Arab, Bedouin and Druse region.

2. **The College of Judea and Samaria, and Sakhnin College** – the northern region, upper northern, and north central.
3. **The Marmanet Co. and the Shachar Institute** – The central region, Jerusalem region, and southern region, Arab / Bedouin.

The winning bids ranged between NIS 7.5 overhead per work hour by a lecturer, to a high of NIS 35 overhead per work hour. Despite the sizeable variation in fees, will all the organizations selected be able to perform at the same level?

Sakhnin College, which won for the north, submitted the lowest bid. Sakhnin College, which is known as “Abu Nazih College,” was chosen over many other colleges founded in the Arab sector recently. Like the others, it has still not accumulated sufficient experience to mount educational projects of the dimensions of the five-year plan. It would appear that its link with the better-established College of Judea and Samaria helped Sakhnin College in the selection process. In practice, there is a tendency on the part of senior people at the Ministry of Education to put the spotlight on Sakhnin College and play down, even hide, its partners at the College of Judea and Samaria which is located in Ariel [on the West Bank], due to the inherent political sensitivity on the part of the Arab public to the latter’s participation in this manner.

The project manager for Sakhnin College, Mr. Omar Badarneh, said in conversation: “We have no connection with the College of Judea and Samaria, neither direct nor indirect. The connection ended after a decision was forthcoming on the contract.” This means that the Ministry of Education selected one entity for the contract, and in practice a different entity is implementing it, with no coordination between the two.

Ahmad Bedarneh, known by his nickname of Abu Nazih, is a businessman who owns a large auto registration inspection station, garages, and gas stations. During the mid-1980s, he promoted preschool teacher training and technological training for young people, and a few years ago he established Sakhnin College. To reinforce Sakhnin College’s stature as an intervention agent for the five-year plan and in technical training in general, the college hired, as a consultant, Dr. Doron Mor who until a year ago was the Ministry of Education’s northern regional director, and Dr. Yoav Santo, an expert on contract tenders and educational personnel.

The Marmanet company, another contractor, is operating in the central and southern regions. The company organizes and manages projects. It was founded four years ago, in cooperation with the Shachar Institute. In reply to our question about a lack of experience, Marmanet’s director of the five-year plan in the south, Mr. Mark Eldad, said that his company was “a spin-off of the Martins Hoffman company, and has a lot of experience managing big educational projects. And we employ Dr. Sami Mahameed as pedagogical director.”

The original plan calls for setting up a community team – school principal, ministry supervisor, representatives of the local council and a representative of the intervention agent. Locally, this is to be the forum that participates in building the program for the community, setting priorities and monitoring implementation. In most localities, these teams were not set up at all. In each school there was supposed to be a team named, and the principal was to be personally responsible for the program. Control and monitoring of the five-year plan’s implementation in the field was to be in the hands of the supervisors, who would be required to work additional hours, without additional pay. A likely outcome for the supervisors was overload and a lower level of performance.

In each of the various regions, a referent was to be named who would monitor implementation of the program. In the northern region (evidently on a temporary basis) the nominee was Mahmoud Diab, a regional supervisor. In a conversation on 10 April 2001 with the director of

Arab education in the Ministry of Education, Mr. Ali Asadi, and with Mr. Salah Taha, supervisor in the elementary education division, it became apparent that at that point they still did not know for certain who was going to be their referent for assistance in operating the program. For the Haifa region, the nominee was regional supervisor Mr. Arsan Iyadat; in the central region, regional supervisor Adnan Amshe; and in the southern region, responsibility was taken by the regional director herself, Amira Haim.

The referent for the northern region, Mr. Mahmoud Diab, confirmed to us that his responsibility as referent did not involve compensation and was to be a part of his regular work, as with the other supervisors. Concerning the workload involved in this additional responsibility, he said: "Yes, this does mean additional work for me and the other supervisors, but I am actually responsible for the overall vision, because the school principal and the local team have direct responsibility for implementation under the supervision of the supervisors and the outside agencies."

It would seem that the supervisors will indeed find it difficult to take time from their regular work to supervise the plan's implementation, for which in any case they will not be compensated.

From a sample check we conducted in ten communities (the names remain confidential) in various regions in April 2001, the community teams had yet to be named and some of the principals with whom we spoke on 17 April 2001 had yet to learn the identity of the referent responsible for the northern region. As of the middle of April 2001, principals had attended no workshop or other training in running the program although, in practice, in some of the communities the program was already operating.

Program implementation thus far

In November of 2000, the three intervention agents were awarded the contract to implement the program. Actual implementation began very late. As of the middle of March, only a few schools had begun running the program. By mid-April, with the end of the school year looming, there were still schools that had not yet begun implementation. Twelfth-grade students, at this writing, are already finished with classes for the year and are preparing for their matriculation examinations. For them, the program comes too late.

In the northern region, the program was not presented to principals until 18 January 2001. In the interim, the technical arrangements have not been completed, aside from one meeting at which the school principals received guidelines from the regions for the month of March. The program's coordinator at supervisor Salah Taha's office explained the late start thus: "In the high schools, implementation of the program began in February, but the late start in implementation in general is due to the bureaucracy at the ministry, which took its time in naming the outside agencies to begin with."

In the central and southern regions, the delay was more serious: Marmanet and the Shachar Institute began implementing the program in the secondary schools only a few days before the long spring break, while in the elementary schools the program did not begin running until 2 May 2001. The director for the program in the south, Marmanet's Mark Eldad, characterized the delay as follows: "This year, we are working to save what can be salvaged of the current school year. And it's due to the ministry itself, which took its time." The consultant to Sakhnin College, Dr. Doron Mor, also said that "the waste of a year and a half is costly, even before the

program has begun running in the schools, and it's a result of internal confusion at the Ministry of Education."

Evidently the little activity that has occurred thus far is characterized by delay on one side and rashness on the other. In any case, the outcome is a widespread uncertainty due to the lack of proper coordination and planning. Clearly the current school year has already been wasted, thanks to the significant delay in setting the program in motion. The question is whether there does or does not exist a sound basis for operating it in an orderly and effective way for the coming school year.

Selection of participating schools and students

During the current (2000-2001) school year, only 238 Arab schools of a total of 570 Arab schools were chosen for inclusion in the program's five-year framework. This limitation obliged the supervisors to favor certain schools over others within the same community. This fact generated arguments and gratuitous shocks to the system, particularly for the principals of the schools not chosen.

Only a small number of students are included in the program. These students were selected by secondary school principals based on report cards: generally, they are the weaker students. This year, weaker students were selected in the elementary schools, comprising about 20% of the student body. These students will have help with either math or (Arabic) language, but the remaining students will get nothing from the program. In the secondary schools, students who had trouble with several subjects on their matriculation examinations were chosen, and the program focused mainly on trying to raise the percentage who would pass their exams at a second sitting.

This approach underlies the failure of the five-year plan. A simple review of the goals and the methods used to achieve them, plus an look at the implementation, reveals that the program is designed to improve statistical outcomes more than to improve education. This method relies on the assumption that "every child can," hence the investment need be made only in reinforcing the capabilities of the individual student or in giving a push to the weaker student who isn't able to fulfill expectations.

What the five-year plan does not address

Below is a list of things that do not appear in the five-year plan, as identified by the Monitoring Committee for Arab Education in Israel:

- ◆ 150 truant officer positions.
- ◆ 160 psychologist positions (based on the Ben-Peretz² plan, 120 positions are needed).
- ◆ Creation of regional treatment programs for special education by type and degree of learning problem / disability.
- ◆ Reducing class size for special education from 24 to 14 students per classroom.
- ◆ Creating a comprehensive planning staff (equivalent to 3 positions) in the special education curriculum division.
- ◆ Creation of new programs for gifted students, in at least 5 localities yearly.

² The Ben-Peretz committee, chaired by Prof. Miriam Ben-Peretz, examined the state of Arab education in the mid-1990s and made recommendations for change.

- ♦ Opening of prestigious new technical subjects / tracks and diversification of existing tracks.
- ♦ Establishment of two regional centers yearly for science enrichment activities.
- ♦ Opening regional centers for inservice training for teachers, at least two a year.
- ♦ Special training for people working in various positions in nonformal education.
- ♦ Opening after-school student/family centers (per the Ben-Peretz report – 15 such centers a year over five years).
- ♦ Building of a model to reduce the dropout rate in five towns, addressing the transition from elementary to junior and senior high schools.
- ♦ Opening advisory centers for psychologists who trained abroad, with 5 positions for advisors to provide guidance on the Shefi (psychological counseling service) program.
- ♦ Opening special classes for pre-matriculation study (*mabar: mekademet lebagrut*).
- ♦ Stipends to train 50 Arab teachers in the sciences and technology over 5 years.
- ♦ Inclusion of Arab professionals in the development of curricula and learning materials (5 positions, one per year).

Moreover, the program as it stands does not address the component of the Arab student's cultural identity, a major flaw. Goals and objectives have yet to be formulated for Arab education that will meet the needs of the Arab population and express their feelings and aspirations as a national minority, encompassing identity, on the one hand, and civic role and responsibility on the other. This fact seriously detracts from the program's chances to promote real change in Arab education.

The Arab educational system is subject to a great deal of change from various poorly-defined interventions. The system is still in search of a clear vision as to its goals and objectives. No consensus has been reached as to an image of what its graduates ought to be like. Meanwhile, the system has slipped farther and farther behind, lacking real motivation, without meaningful ties to its surroundings, and dependent on the charity of its masters. Against this background, it's particularly odd that the Ministry of Education would choose the College of Judea and Samaria, located in Ariel (on the West Bank), as one of the intervention agents to bring about a revolution in the Arab educational system.

In conclusion

The proportion of Arab students who pass their matriculation examinations now stands at 31.5% (among them, 35.3% of Druse students and 13.4% of Bedouin students), compared with 45.9% among Jewish students. One may reasonably assume that a concentrated effort in all the schools could raise the percentage within a reasonable time. Yet, the very fact of choosing to aim for improvement couched in these terms – an increase in the percentage passing their matriculation exams, within a reasonable time – while ignoring quality measures like a higher level and type of diploma, shows that the Ministry of Education does not intend to solve the problem of Arab education at its most fundamental level. In response to our question as to whether the program as conceived is really capable of bridging the gaps that exist, regional supervisor Mr. Mahmoud Diab said: "The program is a step in the right direction, if its resources are properly exploited; and there is certainly a great deal to improve."

Among the more conspicuous deficiencies of the program are its emphasis on having an immediate impact, its focus on rapid and acute changes and, mainly, the centrality of matriculation statistics. This focus ignores the need for long-range changes to be thoroughly

assimilated through ongoing effort over a suitable period of time. The pedagogical significance of all this is that, if “success” is forthcoming, it will be only for the moment. When the program is over, things will return to the status quo ante. In this regard, Dr. Khaled Abu Asbeh comments: “The program addresses the symptoms but not the roots of the main problems.”

The Arab educational system in Israel suffers from many shortages, including: teachers without motivation who lack trust in the educational system and lack faith in education as such; the alienation of teachers and students from the material studied, beginning with the emphasis on Jewish history and the justification for Zionism while the question of the students’ own identity and their link with the Palestinian people is glossed over; violence on the part of teachers toward students; a family-based communication network within the schools, which obscures the educational considerations that should be driving day-to-day functioning; etc. What all these have in common is a sense of perpetual detachment, alienation from the state and, most especially, no expectations. Prospects, hopes, anticipation of the future – these are the fuel that drives education. Without them, learning is hollow and all its light extinguished.

A five-year plan for improving Arab education in Israel must address the rehabilitation of educational damage perpetrated over half a century. Done well, this could be a force for the social rehabilitation of an entire public. Raising the grades of weaker students perhaps could be a part of this process, but cannot be its only activity. To focus on such an objective is to miss the point entirely. The current plan’s budget includes an item about formulating programs to address identity and culture at the level of NIS 0.5 million – about one percent of the program’s annual budget. For a program of this nature to relegate this subject to the margins, with no mention of its proposed implementation, not even a sketch of the general direction, detracts in advance from the value of whatever it may achieve.

Looking Ahead

Some decision-makers and politicians would assign Arab citizens a central role in the quest for equality between Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel. This applies, for example, to the rationale for a development program that seeks to encourage changes in cultural and religious tradition as a condition for the allocation of state resources. By this code, one could also make governmental services contingent on the declaration of a particular political stance or a certain attitude toward this or that historical narrative. And indeed, in May 2001, Minister of Infrastructures Avigdor Lieberman sent word to employees of his ministry to cut all ties with Arab local authorities in communities where Naqba³ observances were held. This approach, pursuant to which citizens will be given (or denied) their share of the state's resources and infrastructures based on what they declare to be their attitude toward the state's history, is extremely dangerous both for Arab citizens and for Jewish citizens.

A sense of belonging to the state on the part of any group of citizens is influenced by the extent to which they benefit from its resources and infrastructures. This holds even more true for Arab citizens and their sense of belonging in Israel, since here they are a national minority, and thus their relations with the state are fundamentally different from those of other groups.

The responsibility for this relationship should not be attributed to the state and to the Arab public on an equal basis. The main responsibility must lie where most of the resources are found – with the state; and the state must work a lot harder if it is to win the trust of Arab citizens and inspire a sense of civic affiliation on their part.

In general, to our regret, the findings of the previous Sikkuy report remain valid today. Progress toward parity in the allocation of material resources over the years was been negligible, and this undoubtedly played a part in the accumulation of frustration that led to the events of October 2000. Based on the research reported in these pages, the wake-up call of October 2000 has not yet led to the required change, and budgets for special development programs have remained too lean to effect substantive change in the situation.

Overall, in terms of material resources, the state's pie is by nature limited, and must be divided up equally among all. As noted in the first chapter of this report, equality in resource allocation may have a perceptible impact on the Jewish public as well; at certain stages and from certain standpoints, movement toward parity may benefit Arab citizens more than Jewish citizens. This suggests a need to invest efforts in winning the hearts and minds of the Jewish public so as to prepare them for this novel experience.

The problem of the relationship between the state and its Arab citizens is not only in allocation of material resources, which can be seen and felt. To at least the same degree, there is a problem on an invisible plane, the plane of consciousness. While material resources may be identified and quantified, delineating and defining things on the plane of consciousness is much harder, because here we find intangibles like a feeling of belonging, a collective pride, a cultural presence, self-confidence, and so forth. The Sikkuy report deals mainly with the visible realm, yet the link between the two spheres is quite clear. It would be merely an illusion to think that proper allocation of material resources is sufficient to create a sense of belonging to the state. Parity in resource allocation is a very important step and demonstrates that the state intends to include all its citizens, but goes only part of the distance.

³ El Naqba (“the catastrophe”): the day marking Israel's independence, from the Palestinian standpoint.

Evidently, given the special character of the State of Israel and its basic definition of itself, even the most precise equality in resources may well be insufficient to give Arab citizens the exact same sense of belonging that Jewish citizens enjoy. The definition of the state gives only to Jews this crucial resource on the plane of consciousness – the sense that they belong wholly. The idea of sharing this resource is not, for Jews, a matter of no consequence; and yet, this sense of belonging is something a state should offer to all its citizens, without preferring one group over another. At the same time, this is not a resource that can be allocated with a single stroke of the pen in some ledger, or imparted by government action alone. This is a process that the State of Israel must begin, and not alone.

Beyond basic parity in the material sense, which should be attained immediately, the integration of Arab citizens and their place in this state will evidently be determined through a process of dialogue between the Arab community as a collective, with its own internal logic, and the state. Here, around this point, the material resources intersect with the resources of consciousness that a state can offer its citizens. A democratic regime by definition promotes enjoyment of all state resources by all its citizens as individuals and by all groups of citizens. The State of Israel has a duty to prove that this is its aspiration.

Shuli Dichter

ABOUT SIKKUY

Sikkuy, the Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality (in Israel), is a non-partisan, not-for-profit advocacy organization that enjoys widespread support from a broad range of Israelis all across the political spectrum. **Sikkuy** was founded in 1991 to promote the values of a civil society in Israel and, in particular, to advance the civic status of **the Arab citizens of the state**.

Sikkuy is jointly governed by an Arab and a Jewish Co-Chairman, **Dr. Hatim Cana'aneh** and **Hanan Bar-On**, and jointly managed by an Arab and a Jewish Co-Director, **Dr. As'ad Ghanem** and **Shalom [Shulij] Dichter**.

Two offices, one in Jerusalem and one in Tamra (Western Galilee), oversee Sikkuy projects throughout the country:

Advocacy

Annual Report on the Status of Arab Citizens

The annual report surveys government policy and resource allocation from the perspective of Arab citizens, assessing the prior year's achievements and making recommendations for the redress of shortcomings through alternative action.

Integration and Fair Representation

This three-year project (1998-2001) aims to increase the presence of Arab citizens in senior positions in the civil service and in the private sector.

Empowering Community Leadership

Promoting Quality Municipal Government

This pioneering program assists elected municipal leadership and community institutions in developing tools for more effective and responsive municipal management in 12 Arab towns and cities. Sikkuy leads and administers this joint initiative with the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Labor and Welfare, the JDC - Israel, and the National Organization of Community Centers.

Civic Action Groups

Groups of citizens are working for equality between Jews and Arabs in local government and in their neighborhoods. The first such group was organized in Misgav and has been active at the regional council level, facilitating the quest for greater equality between Jewish and Bedouin / Arab citizens and between neighboring Jewish and Arab towns in the region. Sikkuy's knowledge and expertise in advocacy, inequality monitoring and alternative policy implementation are being put to good use here. An additional six to ten such groups are slated to begin work within the coming year; two of them are ready to proceed right now. More funding is needed for the growing Misgav program and to extend the initiative to other parts of Israel.

Promoting Civil Society

Programs in the Field of Human Dignity

On the national level, Sikkuy is striving to integrate "human dignity" as a core value in the operating programs of various organizations. On the implementation level, Sikkuy has a team of facilitators who work with interested organizations to develop comprehensive programs promoting human dignity as a basic value, an integral part of any organizational culture, and as a behavioral norm in the larger society.

The Citizen's Guide

A joint venture with the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, the Guide details the rights and responsibilities of every citizen in thirty distinct realms. An updated version for the year 2000 and beyond has been published in Hebrew and Arabic. A companion educational program in Arabic is available for classroom use.